


# QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR ON A MOBILE PHONE



UNIVERSITÉ  
DE GENÈVE

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FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES





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“THE SECURITY OF A CYPHER MUST RESIDE  
ENTIRELY IN THE KEY”

AUGUSTE KERCKHOFFS [1]

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[1] A. Kerckhoffs. *Journal des sciences militaires*, vol. IX:38, 1883.

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# COMPROMISING THE SECURITY OF THE KEY COMPROMISES THE SYSTEM

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- [1] L. Bello. openssl – predictable random number generator. *Debian security advisory 1571-1*, 2008.
  - [2] Bushing, Marcan, Segher, and Sven. PS3 epic fail. 27th Chaos Communication Congress, 2010.
  - [3] R. Chirgwin. Android bug batters bitcoin wallets. *The Register*, 2013.
  - [4] L. Dorrendorf, Z. Gutterman, and B. Pinkas. Cryptanalysis of the random number generator of the windows operating system. *ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.*, 13(1):1–32, 2009.
  - [5] A. K. Lenstra, H. J. P., M. Augier, J. W. Bos, T. Kleinjung, and C. Wachter. Ron was wrong, Whit is right. *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, 2012.
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


- [1] L. Bello. openssl – predictable random number generator. *Debian security advisory 1571-1*, 2008.
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# CURRENT COMMERCIAL RNG IMPLEMENTATIONS

- Software (not random)
- Microphone (can be controlled)
- PLL (no one knows...)
- Shot noise in diode (slow)
- Quantis (“large” and “expensive”)






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# SIMPLIFIED PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION

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


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# SIMPLIFIED PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION

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




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# SIMPLIFIED PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION

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




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# CONCEPT

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




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

# CONCEPT

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

# CONCEPT





# FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH



→ COOL APPLICATIONS





# MOBILE PHONE SENSORS ARE EXCELLENT!

- Low noise ( $< 1 e^-$ ), linear, *small pixels, low capacitance before amp*
- Fast (1 Gpixel/s  $\sim$  10 GBits/s) *for video*
- Cheap ( $\sim 1\$$ ); market for *billions* of sensors (I have 30 at home)
- CMOS technology: source, detector and processing on a single chip.





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# TESTED WITH TWO CAMERAS

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Astronomy CCD  
(ATIK 383L+)



Noise: 10 e<sup>-</sup>

Phone CMOS  
(Nokia N9)




Noise: 3 e<sup>-</sup>

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




detector model






# detector model







## detector model



|   | ATIK 383L         | Nokia N9 |
|---|-------------------|----------|
| Noise, $\sigma_t$ ( $e^-$ )               | 10                | 3.3      |
| Saturation ( $e^-$ )                      | $2 \times 10^4$   | 500      |
| Illumination ( $e^-$ )                    | $1.5 \times 10^4$ | 410      |
| Quantum uncertainty, $\sigma_q$ ( $e^-$ ) | 122               | 20       |
| Offset ( $e^-$ )                          | 144               | -6       |
| Output bits per pixel                     | 16                | 10       |
| Quantum entropy per pixel                 | 8.3 bits          | 5.7 bits |
| Quantum entropy per raw bit               | 0.52              | 0.57     |




# NON-IDEAL CAMERA: STILL OK



Even if Eve has full knowledge of the technical noise, the best she can do is recover the quantum noise.




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


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# UP TO 10 RANDOM BITS PER PIXEL


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$$\begin{aligned} H_{\min}(X_q) &= -\log_2 [\max (P_q(n))] \\ &= -\log_2 \left[ \max \left( \frac{e^{-\bar{n}} \bar{n}^n}{n!} \right) \right] \\ &= -\log_2 \left[ \frac{e^{-\bar{n}} \bar{n}^{[\bar{n}]}}{[\bar{n}]!} \right] \end{aligned}$$






# DETECTOR LINEARITY IS IMPORTANT





# RANDOMNESS EXTRACTOR






[1] D. Frauchiger, R. Renner, and M. Troyer. True randomness from realistic quantum devices. arXiv preprint arXiv:1311.4547, 2013.

[2] M. Troyer and R. Renner. A randomness extractor for the quantis device. Id Quantique technical report, 2012.

$\sim 2 \times 10^{96}$   
trials before a  
deviation is found



# TESTS, “DIEHARDER”






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# SPEED

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Sensor:  $8 \text{ Megapixels} \times 30 \text{ frames/s} \times 3 \text{ bits} = 720 \text{ Mbit/s}$


Extractor: software  $\sim 10 \text{ Mbps}$ ; FPGA  $\sim 1.25 \text{ Gbps}$

Mobile phone: limited memory



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# MOST “CALIBRATED” SOURCES ARE USABLE, WITH CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS.



Test of LED photon number distribution with single photon detector






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# CAN BE COMPLETELY INTEGRATED ON CHIP

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# CONCLUSION

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- Cheap image sensors really work at the quantum level
  - QRNG can be made cheaply and integrated, using existing technology
  - Still some work on the theory required
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# THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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Hugo  
Zbinden



Anthony  
Martin



Nicolas  
Gisin

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# 7TH ID QUANTIQU WINTER SCHOOL

## 18 JAN -22 JAN 2015

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Tutorial by:

- Whitfried Diffie
- Colin Williams (D-Wave)
- Nicolas Gisin
- Eleni Diamanti
- Tracy Northup
- Sandu Popescu
- Mikael Afzelius
- Renner Renato

