

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution in practical scenarios

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Outline




- 1. Motivations
- 2. Eliminate the calibration of reference frames
 - Reference-frame-independent MDI QKD
 - MDI QKD robust against environmental disturbances
- 3. Eliminate the source characterization
 - MDI QKD with uncharacterized encoding
- 4. Conclusions

Motivations: Practical Security



- ☐ Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides unconditional theoretical security;
- Real-life devices & systems compromise the practical security.




Motivations: MDI QKD protocol



- ☐ Based on time-reversed entanglement protocol,
- ☐ Immune to all possible measurement attacks,
- ☐ Great balance between security and practicability,
- ☐ Promising for star-type QKD networks.

- ☐ Suffers from *reference frame drift*,
- ☐ Still requires *trustworthy* quantum state preparation.



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Motivations



> Eliminate the calibration of reference frames

> Eliminate the source characterization

Reference calibrations in MDI QKD




Polarization coding




Phys. Rev. A 82, 012304 (2010). New J. Phys. 15, 073001 (2013).

Phase coding




Quantum Inf. Process. 13, 1237 (2014).

Indistinguishable photons



Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130502 (2012).

- Compromise the practical security;
- □ Poor performance with inefficient calibration;
- Result in extra overheads.



[&]quot;Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution." Phys. Rev. Lett. 107, 110501 (2011).

[&]quot;An attack aimed at active phase compensation in one-way phase-encoded QKD systems." Eur. Phys. J. D 68, 1 (2014).

RFI MDI QKD



- ☐ The Z basis states are well defined;
- \Box The X, Y basis states may vary with the reference drift β .

 $Z_A(Z_B)$ X_A Y_A Y_B

Z basis states: $|0\rangle$, $|1\rangle$ Robust!

X basis states:
$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + e^{i\beta_{A(B)}}|1\rangle)$$
, $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - e^{i\beta_{A(B)}}|1\rangle)$

Y basis states:
$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + ie^{i\beta_{A(B)}}|1\rangle)$$
, $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - ie^{i\beta_{A(B)}}|1\rangle)$

$$C = (1 - 2e_{XX})^2 + (1 - 2e_{YY})^2 + (1 - 2e_{XY})^2 + (1 - 2e_{YX})^2$$

- \Box Does not change with β ;
- ☐ Effective for bounding Eve's information.

A. Laing et al., Phys. Rev. A 82, 012304 (2010). Z-Q. Yin et al., Quantum Inf. Process. 13, 1237 (2014).

RFI MDI QKD



Wavelength-locking laser

- Center wavelength locked to 1542.38nm;
- Center wavelength accuracy: 0.0001 nm (10 MHz);
- Frequncy linewidth after wave chopping: 400MHz.

Faraday-Michelson Interferometer

- Two time-bins with 24.5 ns delay;
- Arbitrary qubit preparation with high efficiency;
- Intrinsically stable to polarization fluctuations.

Qasky WT-SPD 100

- Gate width: 2.5 ns;
- Average efficiency: 12%;
- Dark count rate: 9.79×10⁻⁶ per gate;
- Dead time: $5 \mu s$.


C. Wang et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 160502 (2015).

Fine-tuned timing system

- Pulse generating with a duration of 2.5 ns;
- Trigger signal for all devices;
- 10 ps resolution of adjustment.


Electrical polarization controller

- Arbitrary polarization state transformation;
- Check the HOM dip every 30 min.




Challenges ahead






The fiber birefringence can be affected and accumulated by environmental disturbances.



Polarization in field fibers




Temperature



57km terrestrial fiber: 100% variation of Stokes in 20min.


JLT 10, 552 (1992).

Stress(wind)




180km aerial fiber

IEEE Photon. Tech. Lett. **15**, 882 (2003).



180km aerial fiber, with 220KV-50Hz AC line IEEE Photon. Tech.

Lett. **15**, 882 (2003).




45km installed fiber in Tokyo

OE, 20, 16339 (2012)

Robust MDI QKD





LD: laser diode

PM: phase modulator

PG: pulse generation

PS: polarization scrambling

EPC: E-polarization controller

FMI: Faraday-Michelson

interferometer

FM: Faraday mirror

VOA: variable optical attenuator

ATT: attenuator **BS:** beam splitter

PBS: polarizing beam splitter

Det: detector (Qasky)

- √ Frequency-locked lasers
- √ Timing calibration
- × Phase reference calibration
- × Polarization calibration



- MDI QKD with minimum auxiliary equipment for calibration;
- Robust against extreme channel conditions and multi-user networks.

C. Wang et al., Optica 4, 1016 (2017).

Motivations




> Eliminate the calibration of reference frames


> Eliminate the source characterization

State preparation errors











- ☐ *Inevitable* imperfections of the preparation states.
- Compromise the practical security of MDI systems.

Existing solutions: Full characterizations required.



D. Gottesman et al., Quantum Inf. Comput. 5, 325 (2004).



- Full characterization of the signal states
- Rejected-data analysis

K. Tamaki et al., Phys. Rev. A 90, 052314 (2014).

Z. Tang et al., Phys. Rev. A 93, 042308 (2016).

Mismatched-basis statistics




■ Why mismatched-basis statistics can be used for security:

Projection states: BSM:
$$\begin{cases} |\phi^{+}\rangle = (|0\rangle|0\rangle + |1\rangle|1\rangle)\sqrt{2} \rightarrow \text{message: } 1\\ others \rightarrow \text{message: } 0 \end{cases}$$

Encoding states:
$$Z \ basis: \begin{cases} 0:|0\rangle \\ 1:|1\rangle \end{cases} \ X \ basis: \begin{cases} 2:|+\rangle = (|0\rangle + |1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} \\ 3:|-\rangle = (|0\rangle - |1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} \end{cases}$$

$\overline{}$								
z x,y	0,0	0,1	1,0	1,1	2,2	2,3	3,2	3,3
0	1/2	1	1	1/2	1/2	1	1	1/2
1	1/2	0	0	1/2	1/2	0	0	1/2
z	0,2	0,3	1,2	1,3	2,0	3,0	2,1	3,1
0	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4
1	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4



In MDIQKD protocol, Alice and Bob know their encoding states, then above probability table guarantees the security of key bits.

Z. Yin *et al.*, Phys. Rev. A **90**, 052319 (2014).

Mismatched-basis statistics




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Encoding states:
$$Z \ basis: \begin{cases} 0: |0\rangle \\ 1: |1\rangle \end{cases}$$
 $X \ basis: \begin{cases} 0: |0\rangle \\ 1: |1\rangle \end{cases}$

z x,y	0,0	0,1	1,0	1,1	2,2	2,3	3,2	3,3
0 1	1/2 1/2	1 0	1 0	1/2 1/2	1/2 1/2	1 0	1 0	1/2 1/2
$\sqrt{x,y}$	0,2	0,3		1,3	2,0		2,1	3,1
$\frac{z}{0}$	1/2 1/2	1 0	1 0	1/2 1/2	1/2 1/2	1 0	1 0	1/2 1/2




If Alice and Bob's devices are spoiled and send $|0\rangle$ for bits 0 and 2, $|1\rangle$ for bits 1 and 3, then above probability table *cannot* guarantee the security!

Z. Yin et al., Phys. Rev. A 90, 052319 (2014).

MDI QKD with uncharacterized encoding






Rebound the Phase error rate:

$$e_p \leq e_b + \varepsilon$$

related to mismatched data



Realistic modulation error: 0.033 rad, can't even obtain a positive secure key rate with GLLP-SPF method.

- Preparation perfection or error characterization is no longer required;
- Only two-dimensional quantum states are demanded;
- ☐ Higher security with simpler constructions.

Z. Yin et al., Phys. Rev. A 90, 052319 (2014).

C. Wang et al., Optics Letters **41**, 5596 (2016).

Conclusion



1. MDI QKD with encoding reference calibration eliminated

- 1) avoids potential loopholes from additional process;
- 2) mitigates expensive alignment overheads.

2. MDI QKD robust against environmental disturbances

- 1) further lessens the calibration requirements
- 2) stable in extreme channel conditions


3. MDI QKD with uncharacterized encoding

- 1) source error characterization no longer required
- 2) higher security with simpler constructions

... ...



Thank you for your attention



Our QKD group from USTC